In this paper, we develop a model which can potentially reduce these gaps. Our innovation is a simple one: we introduce a financing constraint into the investment timing model of McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . 2 In that model, the firm has perpetual rights to an investment project and wishes to choose the exercise date which provides the highest expected payoff. The optimal investment strategy consists of investing as soon as project value exceeds a threshold reflecting the value of further delay. However, this policy assumes that the firm can always raise sufficient funds to finance the project, so waiting to invest does not induce any financing risk. Mauer and Triantis (1994) extend this model to incorporate taxes, transactions costs, and alternative financing methods and use it to analyze the simultaneous determination of investment and the debt/equity choice, but do not allow for the possibility that the necessary funding cannot be obtained. By contrast, we explicitly permit the possibility of funding shortfalls by assuming that the firm is either unable or unwilling to access external capital markets, thereby necessitating that all investment be financed with internal funds. 3 This requirement restricts the states in which the firm can invest, so it lowers both the investment threshold and the value of the project rights. Moreover, for a given current cash stock, greater uncertainty about future cashflow exacerbates these effects. Overall, the introduction of a financing constraint significantly reduces the value of waiting to invest and thus causes the constrained firm to invest at an earlier date than an otherwise-equivalent unconstrained firm. 4 Thus, our model highlights a new way in which costly external financing can distort investment behavior: the threat of a future funding shortfall leads to sub-optimal early investment.
It also identifies an additional motivation for hedging: when the timing of investment is flexible, hedging allows the firm to delay investment and thus avoid sub-optimal early investment. We show that these features have implications for the issues outlined in the introductory paragraph:
(i) cash-constrained firms can have smaller investment-cashflow sensitivities than lessconstrained firms, (ii) greater uncertainty may increase or decrease investment depending on the source of the uncertainty, (iii) hedging has an ambiguous effect on the optimal level of investment.
Our approach is broadly similar to that of Mello and Parsons (2000) who consider a financially-constrained firm with stochastic input and output prices and derive the optimal operating and hedging policies. Like us, they emphasize the role of the financing constraint in restricting the firm's options. However, because they focus on the operating policy of a firm that has already invested, they do not consider the effects of the financing constraint on the initial decison to invest and thus cannot shed any light on the empirical investment issues described above.
In the next section, we set out our model. We begin by summarizing the investment decision of the unconstrained firm. We then incorporate a financing constraint and examine the effects this has on the optimal investment policy. In section 3, we explain how these effects can shed some light on various aspects of observed investment behavior. Section 4 examines the role of hedging and Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
Investment under uncertainty: financially constrained and unconstrained firms (i) The unconstrained firm
In order to provide a benchmark for illustrating the effects of an investment financing constraint, we begin by briefly summarizing the investment timing model developed by McDonald and Siegel (1986) and simplified by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . In that model, a firm owns the rights to an investment project and has the option to invest in this project at any time. If the firm invests, it pays a fixed amount I and receives a project worth V. Prior to exercise, project value follows the geometric Brownian motion process dV = µV dt + σV dε (1) where µ and σ are constant parameters and dε is the increment of a Wiener process. In this situation, the firm invests if and only if V exceeds some fixed threshold V * u , where we use the subscript 'u' to denote that this is the investment threshold for the unconstrained firm. Let . Then the optimal investment policy consists of choosing the threshold V * u that maximizes F u . Standard replication arguments imply that, prior to investment, F satisfies the differential equation
where
) is the first (second) derivative of F u , r is the riskless interest rate and δ is the opportunity cost of cashflows forgone due to waiting (henceforth the project's "dividend yield").
Given the boundary conditions
equation (2) has the unique solution
Maximizing (3) with respect to V * u yields the optimal investment threshold V * u = βI β -1 , and investment option value
It is straightforward to show that β > 1, so V * u > I. That is, there are positive payoff (V > I) states in which the firm does not invest. In doing so, the firm retains the opportunity to receive potential higher payoffs should project value rise (or avoid losses if project value falls).
However, this ignores the possibility that waiting may weaken the firm's ability to finance the project, so the model described above assumes that project financing is guaranteed at all dates. This is possible if the firm has unlimited internal funds or has costless access to fairly-priced external funds, but if it faces informational asymmetries of the kind envisaged by Myers and Majluf (1984) , or the agency problems described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , or it does not wish to reveal information to competitors about the project at the investment stage, then external funding is costly. To understand the implications of financing constraints for the investment timing decision, we next consider the situation where the firm's financing choices are restricted.
(ii) The constrained firm
In this case, we assume that the firm is restricted to financing the project with internal funds, i.e., there is no access to external capital markets. 5 The firm begins with an initial cash balance X which, over time, is augmented in two ways. First, if the firm does not launch the project, X is invested in riskless securities. Second, the firm's existing physical assets generate operational cashflow. Thus, prior to investment in the project, the firm's cash stock follows the process dX = rX dt + ν dt + φ dζ (4) where ν and φ are constant parameters and dζ is the increment of a Wiener process with dξdζ = ρdt. Although it plays no formal part in our analysis, it may be helpful to think of (4) as describing a firm with a "lumpy" investment schedule. Additions or extensions to its existing stock of physical assets can take place only in indivisible units and, while the firm is waiting for sufficient funds to accumulate, the existing cash stock is placed in short-term securities. In the meantime, the firm's existing assets continue to augment (or deplete) the cash stock.
Investment is allowed if and only if X ≥ I, so the level of internal funds places restrictions on the time at which the investment option can be exercised. The optimal investment policy can be represented as a function defining, for every value of X, a critical value of V above which the firm should invest. Thus, the investment threshold V The greater complexity of (5) induced by the financing constraint means that an analytical solution for F c is unknown. However, intuition suggests that
The basis for these hypothesized differences between constrained and unconstrained firms is as follows. First, there are V > I states in which the unconstrained firm would exercise the investment option, but the constrained firm has insufficient internal funds and so must continue to wait. The potential for this outcome lowers the value of the project rights. Second, there are V > I states in which the unconstrained firm would choose to wait, but the benefits of doing so for the constrained firm are outweighed by the risks of losing the ability to finance the project. In this case, the constrained firm adopts a lower threshold than the unconstrained firm, but at the cost of sub-optimal early investment which again lowers the value of the project rights. Using numerical techniques, we next explore these differences in greater detail.
(iii) A numerical solution
We solve for the constrained firm's optimal investment timing policy using a numerical procedure based on finite difference methods; details of this procedure are provided in the Appendix. Implementation requires that we specify values for the model parameters. Although we also consider the sensitivity of our results to alternative parameter values, we begin with the benchmark set of values appearing in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Most of the values appearing in Table 1 are similar to those used by other authors, e.g., Milne
and Whalley (2000) and Mauer and Triantis (1994) . The additional parameters are G, ρ and φ.
Although the choice of G is necessarily arbitrary, setting it equal to $100 means that firms with low current liquidity (X < 100) expect to receive a greater proportion of future increments to their cash stocks from the cashflow generated by their existing physical assets than from the interest return on their existing cash stocks. 6 Setting the correlation between X and V to 0.5 is consistent with the investment project being similar, but not identical to, the firm's current assets. Finally, given G = $100 and r = 0.03, φ = $60 is chosen to correspond with actual corporate data. 7 Table 2 provides an initial indication of the effects of financing constraints on the investment timing decision. For various values of initial cash stock X, we calculate the investment thresholds and option values for both unconstrained and constrained firms. 8 These calculations support our hypotheses that the financing constraint lowers both the investment threshold and the option value. For the unconstrained firm with parameters as given in Table 1 , investment should be delayed until project value reaches 220, a policy which causes the project rights to be currently worth $8.06. However, delay for the constrained firm incurs the risk that 6 This seems reasonable insofar as firms that are currently financially constrained are motivated to improve the efficiency of their existing assets in order to break free of the financing constraint. For firms with higher liquidity (X ≥ 100), the primary expected contribution to their cash stocks is from the return on their existing cash. Again, this seems reasonable if, for example, firms that have accumulated high X have done so by skimping on additions to their stock of physical assets.
7 Since rG must equal certainty-equivalent cashflow, the choice of r = 0.03 and G = $100 yields certaintyequivalent cashflow of $3. Assuming no systematic cashflow risk, the choice of φ = $60 implies a ratio of cashflow mean to cashflow standard deviation of (1/20), approximately the value found for US firms listed in the COMPUSTAT database between 1995 and 1999. the firm's cash stock will drop below $100, thereby making investment (temporarily, at least)
impossible. This additional risk makes waiting less valuable, so the optimal investment policy for the constrained firm requires a lower threshold than for the unconstrained firm. This in turn lowers the value of the investment option. For example, when the constrained firm's current cash stock is just sufficient to cover the investment cost (X = $100), the threshold is 141 and the opportunity cost of immediate investment (V * c -I) is 41, some 66% less than for the unconstrained firm. Not surprisingly, this lowers the value of the investment option, in this case to a level some 46% below its unconstrained value. Even when the firm's current cash stock is double that needed for investment, the investment option is 20% below its unconstrained value.
Overall, it seems that the existence of a financing constraint may cause the firm to sacrifice a significant proportion of a project's potential value.
[Insert Table 2 ) and the firm's initial cash stock (X). As X rises above I, the risk that the firm will have insufficient cash to finance the project in the future falls, thereby increasing the increasing the incentive to wait (in order to learn more about project value) and raising the investment threshold. Initially, this effect is strong as increases in X from a low level significantly reduce the probability of future funding shortfalls. 9 Eventually however, the risk of such shortfalls becomes trivial, so further increases in X have little effect and the constrained firm's threshold converges on that of the unconstrained firm. Figure 1 also illustrates the influence of cashflow volatility φ. For each X, greater cashflow volatility increases the amount by which the constrained firm's threshold deviates from its unconstrained counterpart. The greater is φ, the greater the likelihood that adverse cashflow shocks will eliminate the firm's ability to finance the project when it wishes to invest. In response, the firm reduces its exposure to this risk by lowering the investment threshold. We can think of this as a formalized "bird-in-the-hand" strategy; a relatively small payoff received soon and with low risk is preferable to a potentially large payoff received later if there is significant risk of the latter payoff becoming zero due to a funding shortfall. 10 Figure 2 displays the relationship between the value of the investment option (F c ) and the firm's initial cash stock and shows that this depends on the current project value (V). In general, a rise in X decreases the risk that the firm will have insufficient cash to finance the project in the future, thereby increasing the value of waiting and raising F c . If V is low, the expected waiting time is long and so the funding shortfall risk is high even if X is currently well above the investment cost I. In this case, F c increases monotonically with X until it converges on the unconstrained option value. By contrast, if V exceeds the unconstrained investment threshold, then F c first rises sharply with X for values of X that are less than the investment cost I (because additional cash reduces the expected sub-optimal delay in investment), but is then independent of X beyond this point (because investment occurs and F c = V -I). Finally, if V is greater than I, but less than the unconstrained investment threshold, the relationship becomes more complex.
Then, for X < I, F c is strongly increasing in X because each additional dollar reduces the probability that the firm will face a funding shortfall when the optimal investment date arrives.
For X equal to I, the potential benefits of delaying investment are outweighed by the risk of subsequently losing the ability to finance the project, so the firm invests and additional increments to X have no effect on F c . However, for X sufficiently greater than I, the funding shortfall risk is small enough for investment delay to again become the optimal strategy.
10 One implication of Figure 1 is that investment hurdle rates rise with firm liquidity. Surveys by Summers (1987) and Poterba and Summers (1995) report hurdle rates well in excess of any reasonable cost of capital, a finding that Dixit and Pindyck (1994) suggest can be explained by investment timing considerations; investment incurs the opportunity cost of forgoing the option to wait, so the project hurdle rate contains a "premium" in recognition of this cost. If the Dixit and Pindyck hypothesis is correct, then our model implies that the cross-sectional variation in "excess" hurdle rates (i.e., the hurdle rate minus the firm's cost of capital)
should reflect the cross-sectional variation in liquidity. That is, the excess hurdle rate should be an increasing function of firm liquidity.
Additional increases in X then raise the value of the investment option until it converges on the unconstrained option value.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Our results suggest that the value to the firm of additional cash can be far greater than the face value of the cash. An illustration of the magnitude of this effect is provided in Figure 3 where we plot the marginal value of cash for the constrained firm (∂F c /∂X). When V > I > X, an additional dollar of cash can add more than $1.50 to the value of project rights, thereby increasing firm value by $2.50. When either V < I or X > I, the effect on firm value is more modest, but frequently exceeds $1. Only when V exceeds the unconstrained threshold and X is greater than 100 does firm value change only by the face value of the additional cash.
Some economic implications
A recent debate has focused on whether or not the sensitivity of investment to firm liquidity is a useful measure of financing constraints. Beginning with an influential paper by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) , the standard approach has been to divide a sample of firms into groups reflecting a priori rankings of likely financial constraints and then compare the investment-cashflow sensitivities of these different groups. Most studies find that the firms that a priori seem most likely to be financially constrained exhibit greater investment-cashflow sensitivity, thereby suggesting that the investment-cashflow sensitivity is indeed a useful measure of the severity of financing constraints. However, this approach has been criticized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) . Most tellingly, they find that within the sample of firms Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen argue are most likely to be financially constrained, the firms with significant liquidity problems exhibit a lower investment-cashflow sensitivity than the firms that appear unlikely to have been financially constrained. Kaplan and Zingales stress that it is important to understand the source of this result and speculate that it may be due either to nonlinearities in the external finance cost function or to currently unknown aversions to raising external finance. Our model suggests another solution. The conventional view is that when external financing is more costly than internal finance, a greater cash stock increases current investment by lowering the cost of capital. However, our model indicates that another effect is also at work; a greater cash stock lowers the risk of delaying investment and thereby increases the threshold required to justify current investment. Thus, the net impact on investment depends on which of these effects dominates. Recall that (see Figure 1 ) the threshold-cash relationship is greatest for firms that are most financially constrained (low X) because these are the firms for whom delay poses the greatest risks, so for a given cost of capital effect, an increase in cash has a smaller net effect on the investment of these firms than it does on less financially-constrained firms. That is, the investment of relatively tightly-constrained firms is less sensitive to changes in cash than is the investment of firms facing weaker constraints, essentially the pattern observed by Kaplan and Zingales. Our model therefore provides some support for the view that observed investment-cashflow sensitivities may indicate little about the severity of financing constraints. 11
Our model can also shed some light on the relationship between investment and uncertainty. In the standard model of the unconstrained firm, all uncertainty eminates from the stochastic evolution of project value, so greater uncertainty increases the value of waiting and lowers investment. However, the empirical evidence for this relationship is inconclusive; Ghoshal and Loungani (1996, 2000) find the expected relationship between investment and price or profit uncertainty in industries with large numbers of small firms, but not for other industry structures; Caballero and Pindyck (1996) report a statistically significant relationship between investment and the variance of the marginal revenue product of capital, but one that is substantially smaller than predicted by the unconstrained firm model. Our model suggests one 11 We implicitly define a firm to be more financially constrained if it has fewer funds available for investment. A broader definition (and one more commonly used in the literature) of a more severe financing constraint is a greater wedge between the cost of external and internal funds. By this definition, all firms are equally constrained in our model (as none can access external funds), yet, as we have seen, they may have different investment-cashflow sensitivities. Thus, our conclusion -that observed investment-cashflow sensitivities may indicate little about the severity of financing constraints -also holds for this broader definition of financial constraints.
possible reason for this discrepancy. In the presence of a financing constraint, uncertainty stems from two sources -project value and firm cashflow -and these have opposite effects on the investment threshold; uncertainty about project value raises the threshold while uncertainty about firm cashflow lowers it. Thus, any attempt to empirically identify the relationship between uncertainty and investment will pick up offsetting uncertainty effects unless the exact nature of the uncertainty is carefully identified. For example, the uncertainty measures used by Ghoshal and Loungani and Caballero and Pindyck seem likely to include aspects of both value and cashflow uncertainty, so it is unsurprising that the estimated relationship between investment and uncertainty is small or non-existent. By contrast, Shin and Stulz (2000) explicitly focus on cashflow volatility and find that this adversely affects shareholder wealth in a monotonic fashion, a result they attribute to financial distress costs of volatility. However, this result is also consistent with our model; from Figure 2 , greater cashflow volatility reduces the value of the investment option (and therefore shareholder wealth) because it increases the likelihood that the financing constraint will bind, thereby resulting in sub-optimal investment timing.
The hedged firm
In the previous section, the firm was permitted to hold long positions in a riskless asset, but was unable to undertake any other securities transactions. Thus, it was unable to hedge its cashflow risk. In this section, we derive and characterize the optimal hedge policy and consider the effects of this policy on the investment threshold and option value.
We assume the firm can maintain a dynamic hedge. Specifically, at time t the firm holds h t short positions in an asset or portfolio with price x t whose returns are perfectly correlated with firm cashflow. The proceeds hx from this activity are held in a margin account earning interest at a rate r < r. This arrangement ensures that the short positions can only be used to hedge operating cashflows (and not to raise cash) and that hedging is costly. In this case, the investment threshold V 
-(r -r )hx (6) where σ x is the standard deviation of returns on the spanning portfolio. The optimal hedge policy is found by solving the Bellman equation
-(r -r )hx }, so the value of the optimal hedge position is given by
The first two terms on the right side of (7) represent the optimal demand for hedging in the absence of transactions costs; the last term captures the reduction in this optimal demand due to the forgone interest (r -r ) that hedging requires. To understand the meaning of the first two terms more fully, note first that any hedging policy typically reduces cashflow volatility by shifting cash from high-cash states to low-cash states. In equation (7), the first term gives the value of the complete hedge position, i.e., the hedge that completely eliminates random fluctuations in the firm's cashflow. However, shifting cash from a high-cash state to a low-cash state is counter-productive if the marginal value of cash is high in the former state, but low in the latter state. Consequently, the optimal hedging policy does not shift cash from all high-cash states to all low-cash states, but only from high-cash states in which the marginal value of cash is low to low-cash states in which the marginal value of cash is high. 12 Thus, if the correlation between V and X is positive (ρ > 0), then low-cash states also tend to be those in which cash is not very valuable, so the optimal hedge position is less than the complete hedge position. On the other hand, if ρ < 0, then low-cash states also tend to be those in which the value of cash is high, so the optimal hedge position is less than the complete hedge position. 13 The idea that the optimal hedging quantity is a decreasing function of the correlation between cashflow and project value has previously been noted by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) in a model which shows that a firm should hedge in order to ensure that it is able to undertake profitable investments when they arise. In both our model and that of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, positive correlation between X and V reduces the need for hedging because it implies that cashflow is low in states where the marginal value of cash is low.
However, there is an important difference between their argument and ours. In the Froot, Scharfstein and Stein model, cash has value because it allows the firm to invest, so insufficient hedging may cause the firm to forgo investment. Thus, hedging adds value because it allows investment to occur. In our model, by contrast, cash has value because it allows the firm to retain the option to invest, so insufficient hedging may cause the firm to invest prematurely.
Hedging adds value because it allows investment to be delayed. This principle can be seen in Figure 2 for the firm with V = 175. For X in the region of 100, the risk of losing the ability to finance the project discourages the firm from waiting and investment occurs immediately. Only when X rises sufficiently far above 100 does waiting again become optimal. In this situation, a their Proposition 2, that the hedging policy given by the first two terms in (7) minimizes var(F h X ), the volatility of the marginal value of cash. 13 This implicitly assumes that F h XV > 0. Although this is generally the case, the reverse sign holds in the region where V is just below the investment threshold. In that region, additional cash makes the value of the investment option less sensitive to changes in V, i.e., ∂F/∂V declines in X. The reason is that extra cash gives the firm the flexibility to wait before investing, so the threshold increases and ∂F/∂V falls below the value (= 1) it takes in the investment region. In this singular region, positive (negative) ρ means that lowcash states also tend to be those in which the value of cash is high, so the optimal hedge position is less than the complete hedge position.
suitable hedge would increase the value of the investment option by reducing the number of states in which premature investment occurs.
The optimal hedge in our model can thus be greater or less than its counterpart in the Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) model. On the one hand, allowing the firm to choose the timing of its investment reduces its need for hedging since it does not lose the project if funding is not available on a given date. On the other hand, the need to maximize the value of the investment option may increase the quantity of required hedging. For example, suppose X and V are perfectly positively correlated such that X exceeds 100 whenever V exceeds 100. Then the optimal Froot, Scharfstein and Stein hedge is zero. But for firms with an ongoing option to invest, the value of this option is positive even when V < 100 and, moreover, is enhanced by additional X. Consequently, firm value would be increased by a hedge that moved cash from states where X is more than sufficient to finance investment to states where X is low.
The effect of the optimal hedge on the investment threshold is displayed in should, all else equal, invest more than non-hedging firms. 14 However, after adjusting for size differences, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2000) report little difference in the level of investment between the two groups of firms while Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) find that non-hedgers invest more than hedgers. 15 Our model suggests that these findings may be due to the ambiguous effect of hedging on the attractiveness of investment. On the one hand, hedging allows firms to undertake more investment. On the other hand, it also reduces the risk of waiting to invest and thus raises the investment threshold. Since these two effects work in opposite directions, it is not surprising that the data reveal little difference in investment between hedging and non-hedging firms.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Conclusion
When external finance is more costly than internal finance, firms may be forced to rely on internal funds to finance investment. Although this fundamental point has long been recognized, its implications for optimal investment timing have not previously been analyzed. In this paper, we show that imposing a "cash-in-advance" type constraint on firms lowers the value of waiting to invest. This has two principal implications:
1. The threat of future financing shortfalls leads to current over-investment.
2. Hedging protects the value of the firm's investment options and thus gives it the flexibility to delay investment.
The first of these identifies a new way by which costly external financing can distort investment behavior; the second identifies an additional rationale for hedging. These basic results have implications for several unexplained empirical phenomena:
3. Greater cashflow permits more investment, but also raises the threshold required to justify investment. Since the latter effect is greatest for tightly-constrained firms, such firms may have lower investment-cashflow sensitivities than firms that are less constrained. This contrasts with the conventional view that high sensitivities indicate strong constraints, but is consistent with the evidence of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) .
4. Greater uncertainty about future investment opportunities increases the threshold required to justify investment, but greater uncertainty about future cashflow decreases it. Since most empirical measures of uncertainty contain elements of both these types, their offsetting effects can help explain why the observed relationship between investment and uncertainty is weak.
5. Cashflow hedging reduces the risk of future financing shortfalls, but in so doing increases the value of waiting to invest and thus raises the threshold required to justify investment. Thus, the effect of hedging on the level of corporate investment is ambiguous, consistent with existing empirical data.
(i) Derivation of equation (5) We assume that the risks inherent in V and X are spanned by the market of existing securities. Specifically, suppose that there are traded assets or portfolios with prices v and x that evolve according to
Then a long position in the investment option can be combined with short positions of σVF V /(vσ v ) units of asset v and φF X /(xσ x ) units of asset x to produce a total return dR over the time interval dt such that (for shorthand, we drop the 'c' superscript on F since it is obvious that we are referring only to the constrained firm)
Using Itô's Lemma to obtain an expression for dF, substituting (A-1) and (A-2) for dv and dx respectively, and simplifying, we obtain
Since this return is riskless, the portfolio must earn the riskless rate of return. Therefore, dR = r[F -σVF V /(σ v ) -φF X /(σ x )] dt. Equating this to the above expression for dR means that F satisfies the differential equation
Further simplification can most readily be obtained if we assume the expected returns µ v and µ x are given by some equilibrium model such as the CAPM. If the latter holds, then
where ρ xm (= ρ Xm ) and ρ vm (= ρ Vm ) are the correlation coefficients of the market return with dx and dv respectively, and λ is the market price of risk. If δ ≡ µ v -µ is the project's dividend yield, then
Hence, the (A-3) coefficient on VF V , (µ -
Now let G denote the the market value of a claim to the future cashflow generated by the firm's existing physical assets. Clearly, from (4), G is independent of X and V, so dG = 0 over time interval dt. Thus, the return on a long position in G consists only of the current cashflow (ν dt + φ dζ). Hence, using (A-2), a long position in G combined with a short position in φ/(xσ x ) units of asset x yields a total return of
Since this return is riskless, we must have
which implies that the (A-3) coefficient on F X , (ν -
) is equal to rG. Making this substitution back into (A-3) yields the final form of the differential equation that F must satisfy
(ii) Derivation of equation (6) Over the time interval dt, the firm's initial cash stock pays interest equal to rX t dt, the margin account pays interest equal to r h t x t dt, and the firm's existing operations generate cashflow equal to ν dt + φ dζ t . In addition, the firm must inject cash equal to h t dx t into the margin account to maintain the required balance. Thus, the change in the firm's cash stock is dX = (rX + ν + (r -µ x )hx)dt + (φ -σ x hx) dζ.
The firm now holds a portfolio consisting of a long position in the project rights F h , a short position in asset x, and an interest-bearing margin account. Over the time interval dt, the change in the value of this portfolio equals dF + r hx dt -h dx.
Using Itô's Lemma, this becomes Market value of existing physical assets G = $100 Table 1 . For given φ, a rise in the initial cash stock decreases the risk that the firm will have insufficient cash to finance the project in the future, thereby increasing the value of waiting and raising the investment threshold. For given X, a rise in cashflow volatility increases the risk that the firm will have insufficient cash to finance the project in the future, thereby decreasing the value of waiting and lowering the investment threshold. Table 1 . For given V, a rise in X decreases the risk that the firm will have insufficient cash to finance the project in the future, thereby increasing the value of waiting and raising F c . If V is low, the expected waiting time is high and so F c increases monotonically with X. For intermediate V, an increase in X raises F c for X ≤ I. When X = I, the risk that the firm will have insufficient cash to finance the project in the future offsets the potential gains from waiting, so the project rights are exercised and additional increments in X have no effect on F c until X is sufficiently high to reduce the risk of future funding shortfalls. If V is above the unconstrained threshold, then immediate investment is optimal, so F c increases sharply with X for X ≤ I, but is independent of X thereafter. Table 1 . When V > I > X, an additional dollar of cash can add more than $1.50 to the value of project rights, thereby increasing firm value by $2.50. When either V < I or X > I, the effect on firm value is more modest, but frequently exceeds $1. Table 1 . The optimal hedging policy decreases the risk that the firm will have insufficient cash to finance the project in the future, thereby increasing the value of waiting and raising the investment threshold.
